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Abstract
Using a South African data set, the paper poses six questions about the determinants of
subjective well-being. Much of the paper is concerned with the role of relative concepts. We
find that comparator income – measured as average income of others in the local residential
cluster – enters the household’s utility function positively but that income of more distant
others (others in the district or province) enters negatively. The ordered probit equations
indicate that, as well as comparator groups based on spatial proximity, race-based
comparator groups are important in the racially divided South African society. It is also found
that relative income is more important to happiness at higher levels of absolute income.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we pose six questions. First, to what extent is it absolute income and to what
extent relative income that determines happiness? Second, insofar as relative concepts
matter, is it only relative income that counts or are comparisons made in other dimensions as
well? Third, if relative income matters, who are the relevant others with whom people
compare themselves? Fourth, does low income relative to others decrease or increase
happiness, i.e. given own income, does the income of relevant others affect happiness
negatively or positively? Fifth, does the strength of this relationship weaken as the reference
group is broadened to include socially more distant people? Sixth, does the importance of
relative income vary with the level of absolute income? We attempt to answer these
questions by means of a household survey which, in addition to much socioeconomic
information on the individual, the household and the community, contains a question on
subjective well-being.
In Section 2 we provide a framework of literature, concepts and hypotheses. Section 3
explains the South African context: a society still divided by great racial differences. Section 4
describes the data and method. The empirical section 5 presents the results, question by
question. Section 6 concludes and draws out the implications of the analysis.
2. Concepts and Hypotheses
The idea that relative position matters to individual utility has substantial support and
acceptance in the social science literature, particularly in sociology (for instance, Runciman
1966) and psychology (for instance, Diener and Biswas-Diener 2000). By contrast,
mainstream microeconomic theory generally treats utility as a function of own absolute
income. However, some economists have advocated models in which the income of others
enters the individual’s utility function (prominent among them being Duesenberry, 1949;
Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Scitovsky, 1976). Frank (1985), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Frank and
Sunstein (2001) and Layard (1980, 2003a) have argued that some well-established ideas
about economic policy would be overturned if relative income were to matter.
There is now also a good deal of empirical support for the notion that subjective well-being
depends on relative income (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Watson et. al., 1996; Tsou and Liu,
2001). In some of the studies, utility depends more importantly – or even only (Groot and van
den Brink, 1999) – on relative than on absolute income. One study finds that pay satisfaction
depends not only on relative income but also on ranked position within a comparison set
(Brown et. al., 2003). A study on Nepal finds that perceived consumption adequacy falls as
ward (village) mean consumption expenditure rises (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2003).
Analysis of this sort requires that the comparison set – the group with whom individuals
compare themselves when judging their relative position – be specified. Candidates for an
individual’s reference group are: the individual’s own past; her aspiration or desired future;
others in her family; her spouse; others with similar characteristics; and others in her
residential vicinity or workplace. Since individuals have multiple identities, they may also
have multiple comparators. Various definitions of comparator group are found in the
literature. Many studies have used ‘others with similar characteristics’. For instance, an
individual may match with others on the basis of educational level, occupation, region,
gender, social background and parental characteristics. If people take many characteristics
1
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into account when making comparisons, the multiple dimensions involved present a
matching problem for researchers. One solution that has been attempted is to use predicted
income, derived from an income function, as the comparator income (Clark and Oswald,
1996; Watson et. al., 1996).
What is the expected sign of the relationship between relative income (or other relative
measures) and individual happiness? In general it is posited that subjective well-being varies
inversely with the incomes of relevant others (for instance, Easterlin, 1995; Falk and Knell,
2000). In much of the applied literature that tests it, comparator income is indeed found to
have a negative effect on the subject’s happiness level. The negative relationship is likely to
arise from feelings of relative deprivation, which Runciman (1966, p.11 ) defined as follows:
A is relatively deprived of X if (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some person or persons, which
may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X, (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he
sees it as feasible that he should have X.
Karl Marx (1849, p.163) had developed a similar idea:
Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not
by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a
relative nature.
One reason for feelings of relative deprivation could be a sense of unfairness, or of envy, or of
rivalry with others in the reference group Marx (1849, p. 163) went on to give an example
consistent with this view:
A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all
social demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a
little house to a hut … the occupant of the relatively small house will feel more and more
uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its four walls.
A more benign interpretation is also possible, for instance that the reference group provides
standards or goals to which the individual aspires. Yet another motive was suggested by
Adam Smith (1776, p. 466 ) in the Wealth of Nations:
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the
support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people,
even of the lowest order, to be without.
In his view such customary goods were necessary for the avoidance of shame. Whatever the
motive for feelings of relative deprivation – envy, aspirations or shame – we expect a negative
effect of reference group income on own happiness.
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There are also reasons why the effect of comparator income can be positive. One such
reason is altruism or fellow-feeling. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1759 ,
pp. 255-79) argued that it is in human nature to be altruistic towards other people, although
there is an order in the exercise of human benevolence, from those we know well to those we
know little. The view that people are altruistic is supported by the findings of an experimental
game study by Charness and Grosskopf (2001). Given that the subjects’ own payoffs are
fixed, the authors find:
… a surprisingly low propensity to prefer lower payoffs [for others]: people generally choose to
maximize the material payoffs to others, even when they are greater than their own.
1
Risk-sharing within a community can provide another reason why own happiness is raised by
other peoples’ income. Members of a community may provide each other with mutual social
insurance (Ligon, Thomas and Worrall, 2002). In developing countries, there is commonly an
absence of formal insurance mechanisms. This lack of formal instruments is particularly
important in high unemployment economies and economies with high dependence on risky
agriculture. The literature on risk-sharing in developing country contexts attempts to identify
the household’s insurance or risk-pooling group. Since the cost of enforcement and
monitoring of contracts increases with the size of and distance between members of the
group, an obvious unit in which to observe insurance is the village or neighbourhood.
Townsend (1994) finds for rural India that the village is indeed the relevant insurance group.
However, Grimard (1997) uses anthropological literature on Cote d’Ivoire to suggest that the
insurance group is not the village but a spatially diversified network of members of the same
ethnic group. Bowles and Gintis (2003) develop a model in which ethnic, or ‘parochial’,
networks cooperate not through altruism but through reciprocal benefits derived from the
promotion of trust within the network.
It is also possible that there is a positive relationship between own happiness and community
social capital or education. Helliwell (2001), citing the psychological literature, has argued
that social capital (defined as ‘networks, norms and understandings that facilitate cooperative
activities’) can have a positive effect on subjective well-being. For instance, it is possible that
social capital or education in a community creates positive externalities for its members – if
well-being is raised by networking with people who have higher levels of community
involvement or education.
The composition of the reference group and ‘social distance’ may be closely related. Akerlof
(1997), in modelling social distance, argued that social interaction can influence individual
decisions and aspirations, and that social interaction is inversely related to social distance. In
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1759, p. 157 ) asked whether a person would
be more disturbed by the loss of a hundred million lives in China or by the loss of his own little
finger. He argued that sympathetic feelings would be aroused by the great loss of life in a
faraway country but that those feelings would be attenuated by the physical and social
3
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identity of their partners in the game.
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distance. He suggested (1759, p. 270 ) that it is natural to care most about the ‘order and
society’ to which one belongs.
That wisdom which contrived the system of human affections … seems to have judged
that the interest of the great society of mankind would be best promoted by directing the
principal attention of each individual to that particular portion of it which was most within
the sphere both of his abilities and of his understanding
Social distance can also have an attenuating effect on a positive relationship arising from
social insurance. People are more likely to share risks within a small community – where they
can know and trust each other – than within a large community. The same is true of the
argument made in terms of social capital: own happiness is likely to be based on the extent of
social interaction as well as on its quality. If the attenuation of a positive relationship with
social distance is stronger than that of a countering negative relationship, it is possible for a
net positive effect in a small community to give way to a net negative effect in a large
community.
Social distance can also diminish feelings of relative deprivation. Robert Roberts’ (1971)
account of life in a Salford slum in Edwardian England illustrates how this can happen. The
slum-dwellers, he claimed, did not make comparisons between themselves and people
outside the slum: the strata of society were recognised without question and respect for their
‘betters’ and ‘superiors’ was firmly established. But within the working class, comparisons
were constantly made and social rating was of great importance. Despite desperate poverty,
‘Envy was the besetting sin’, but only inside the slum.2
An obvious measure of social distance is physical distance. This suggests the need to
investigate the role of relativities according to the size of locality, e.g. neighbourhood, village,
town, city, and region. The hypothesis is that the effect of locality income – whether positive or
negative – diminishes as the size of the locality, and thus of the community, increases.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have argued that ‘identity’, i.e. a person’s sense of self, affects
individual behaviour and aspirations. Race and ethnicity can provide a strong basis for
identity, possibly because of their innateness and immutability. In a society with sharp racial
divisions, aspirations may be related to what can be achieved by persons of one’s own race. If
race identifies the reference group, race-based relativities may be important. However, that in
itself does not indicate whether the income of the race group has a positive or negative effect
on own happiness. It is possible that space and race interact, i.e. the reference group is best
defined by the race group within a small locality.
To the extent that happiness depends on the gratification of certain biological and
physiological needs, it is not relative (Veenhoven, 1991). By contrast, Pigou (1920) reasoned
that since the rich derive much of their satisfaction from relative rather than absolute income,
satisfaction would not be reduced if the incomes of all rich people were diminished at the
same time. In a similar vein, others have posited that, in affluent societies, spending
4
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increasingly becomes a means to achieve social status rather than to meet economic needs
(Veblen, 1949), or that perceived needs change with the general level of affluence of others
(Schor, 1998). Easterlin (1995) argues that absolute income matters up to a certain level,
after which relative income increasingly matters.
Much of the economic literature on the importance of relative concepts treats people’s
reference groups as given, yet they could be endogenously chosen by individuals in the
pursuit of certain goals (Falk and Knell, 2000). Nesse (2003) similarly rejects the notion that
our ‘salient others’ are shaped by our culture and genes, and suggests that attention be paid
to how individuals, in trying to satisfy particular psychological desires, create their own social
groups. Feelings of relative deprivation can be reduced if people narrowly confine
comparisons to others with whom they identify, perceived by race or class. There may be a
conscious or unconscious tendency to do this when it is perceived that the disadvantage
cannot be remedied. If a person is strongly motivated for self-improvement, she may make
comparisons upwards, with others superior to herself. On the other hand, where
self-enhancement is important, she may select for comparison people who are inferior if that
makes her feel better. Such choices can induce acts of self-selection into particular reference
groups, for instance via migration or residential relocation (Stark and Taylor, 1991). The
endogeneity of comparator groups can be investigated only with information on individuals’
goals, either from attitude surveys or from revealed preferences such as migration to richer or
poorer neighbourhoods.
This discussion leads to the following hypotheses in relation to the six questions posed at the
start. First, the income of relevant others, as well as own income, influences own happiness.
Second, other characteristics of the reference group, such as the level of education or the
unemployment rate, also influence own happiness. Third, in a racially divided society, the
reference group is defined in terms not only of space but also of race. Fourth, the income of
the reference group may either raise or lower own happiness. Fifth, the strength of this
relationship is weakened as the reference group is broadened to include socially more distant
people. Sixth, the relationship between relative income and happiness is stronger at higher
levels of absolute income.
3. The South African Context
Our data come from the SALDRU National Household Survey of 1993 in South Africa carried
out by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) of the University
of Cape Town. Patterned on the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Studies, the
dataset contains information on about 8800 households, with modules on household
demographics, employment, health, income and expenditure, etc., as well as community
information.
In South Africa race was the defining feature of society until the end of apartheid, with most
aspects of life being governed by racial segregation. For instance, different education
departments catered for the education of the four races – African, Coloured, Indian, and
White – and there was a marked racial hierarchy in resource allocations to schools. There
were restrictions on the movement and migration of non-Whites and they had been debarred
from entering certain higher positions of employment. In such a racially divided society, race
may be an even greater source of identity than it is elsewhere, and it is very likely that
people’s aspirations are, or at the time of the 1993 survey (just before the formal end of
5
apartheid) were, linked to what they believed to be the range of states attainable for persons
of their own race.
We shall test for race-relative effects in two ways: firstly, income relative to that of others of the
same race within the locality and, secondly, the same concept applied at the national level. In
other words, we shall combine space-based and race-based criteria in defining the reference
group of a household.
4. Data and Method
Section 9 of the SALDRU survey is on perceived quality of life. It contains, inter alia, the
question: “Taking everything into account, how satisfied is this household with the way it lives
these days?” The five options available in the pre-coded response are: ‘very satisfied’,
‘satisfied’, ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’, and ‘very dissatisfied’. The
proportion of households reporting these answers were 7.5, 26.4, 9.4, 33.4 and 23.4 percent
respectively. This question forms the basis of our empirical analysis. Whereas much of the
economic literature on comparison income is concerned with job or pay satisfaction, our
focus is on overall satisfaction with life.
Whereas an individual member of the household responded to the survey question, the
question itself related to the satisfaction of the household as a whole rather than to that
individual’s personal well-being. This raises the possibility that the individual answered
mostly with his own personal satisfaction level in mind rather than that of the household as a
whole. In order to address this concern, we check the robustness of the findings to the
inclusion of the individual respondent’s own personal characteristics as explanatory
variables. Appendix Table 1 shows that, controlling for household characteristics, individual
characteristics are generally unimportant in our subjective well-being equations. This is
unsurprising not only because of the question posed but also because there are likely to be
interdependencies in well-being among members of the household.
The reference groups that we investigate are defined by race (four races are identified in the
survey: African, Coloured, Indian and White) and space (enumeration cluster, district and
province). Unfortunately we do not have the information (on personal goals or on migration)
to investigate the possible endogeneity of reference groups. The four races are distributed in
the survey in the proportions 75 per cent African, 7 per cent Coloured, 3 per cent Indian, and
15 per cent White. Included in the survey are 360 clusters, 187 districts, and 9 provinces. The
average size of their populations is 2,900 , 125,400 and 4.46 million respectively, and the
average number of observations 25, 47, and 983 households respectively. Whereas it is
possible to conduct an analysis of race within districts, there are too few observations in each
cell to analyse race at the cluster level; most clusters are racially homogenous.
We begin with the subjective well-being function:
(1)
where W
i
represents reported well-being of the ith individual or household and X is a vector
of socio-economic variables and Z a vector of various relative concepts (such as relative
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income, employment and education). Our measure of W
i
is available as a multiple choice
variable (effectively, “is your household 1. very dissatisfied; 2. dissatisfied; 3. so-so; 4.
satisfied; 5. very satisfied?”). Since there is an inherent ordering, the appropriate estimation
procedure is by means of an ordered probit model.
5. Empirical Results
Table 1 sets out the notation, definitions, means and standard deviations of the variables
used in the analysis.
Table 1: Variable Definitions
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Mean s.d.
Dependent variable
qualife Perceived satisfaction with life: values from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) 2.611 1.30
Control variables
age16-25 proportion of persons within the household aged 16-25 0.198 0.24
age26-35 proportion of persons within the household aged 26-35 0.186 0.28
age36-45 proportion of persons within the household aged 36-45 (omitted category) 0.129 0.23
age46-55 proportion of persons within the household aged 46-55 0.083 0.19
age56-65 proportion of persons within the household aged 56-65 0.059 0.17
age>=66 proportion of persons within the household aged 66 and older 0.051 0.16
hhsizem household size 4.569 2.98
hhnchild number of children below age 16 within the household 1.853 1.96
male proportion of males in household 0.485 0.27
migrate household migrated to its current area within the past 5 years=1; 0 otherwise 0.115 0.31
noedu proportion of household members with less than primary education (omitted category) 0.156 0.25
primary proportion of household members with primary level education 0.305 0.35
junior proportion of household members with junior level education 0.288 0.32
secondary proportion of household members with secondary level education 0.176 0.28
higher proportion of household members with higher level education 0.075 0.22
hhdaysic total number of person days that household members were sick in the past 14 days 3.008 6.38
ironroof house has an iron roof=1; 0 otherwise 0.562 0.50
pipeint house has piped water internally=1; 0 otherwise 0.365 0.48
wdist distance to nearest source of water in meters 182.697 551.23
personpr persons per room in the house 1.415 1.14
connecte house has an electricity connection=1; 0 otherwise 0.510 0.50
nolfpb hhurate see below - is undefined (missing) for households with no labour force
participants (lfp), so for these households, the included variable hhurate takes value 0
and the indicator variable nolfpb takes the value 1. nolfpb=0 for households with >=1 lfp
0.155 0.36
impass community roads become impassable at certain times of the year=1 ; 0 otherwise 0.388 0.49
pubtran community has public transport=1; 0 otherwise 0.731 0.44
racialm household is a racial minority in its cluster=1; 0 otherwise 0.103 0.30
metropol household lives in metropolitan city=1; 0 otherwise 0.283 0.45
urban1 household in urban non-metropolitan area=1; 0 otherwise 0.219 0.41
rural household lives in rural area=1; 0 otherwise (omitted category) 0.498 0.50
homeland household lives in a former homeland/Bantustan=1; 0 otherwise 0.434 0.50
n_victim number of times in the past 12 months that household members have been victims of
crime (robbery, assault, rape, murder, and abduction and other)
0.115 0.36
Table 1, contitnued
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ownship_ household lives in owned home=1; 0 otherwise 0.651 0.48
debt household owes any debt=1; 0 otherwise 0.447 0.50
c_urateb cluster unemployment rate 0.325 0.24
Wcape Western cape province=1 ; 0 otherwise 0.084 0.28
Ncape Northern cape province=1; 0 otherwise 0.013 0.11
Ecape Eastern cape province=1; 0 otherwise 0.136 0.34
Natal Kwazulu Natal province=1; 0 otherwise 0.181 0.39
Ofs Orange Free State province=1; 0 otherwise 0.082 0.27
Etvl Eastern Transvaal province=1; 0 otherwise 0.088 0.28
Ntvl Northern Transvaal province=1; 0 otherwise 0.113 0.32
Nw North West province=1; 0 otherwise 0.099 0.30
pwv Gauteng province=1; 0 otherwise (omitted category) 0.204 0.40
Hypothesis variables
african race dummy=1 if household is of African race, 0 otherwise 0.746 0.44
Coloured race dummy=1 if household is of Coloured race, 0 otherwise 0.077 0.27
indian race dummy=1 if household is of Indian race, 0 otherwise 0.029 0.17
White race dummy=1 if household is of White race, 0 otherwise (omitted category) 0.148 0.35
hhurate household unemployment rate, i.e. proportion of household labour force participant
members that are unemployed. 0.219 0.36
ln_hhcpi natural log of household per capita income 5.575 1.41
assetval value of assets owned by the household, calculated as follows:
assetval=(ncar*8)+(nphone*3)+(nkettle*0.5)+(nradio*0.2)+(nfridge*5)+(nbike*1)
+(nestove*0.5)+(ngstove*1)+(ntv*3) +(ngeyser*2), where the preface n before each
variable means number of. Thus, ncar is number of cars, ntv means number of TVs,
nestove is number of electric stoves and ngstove is number of gas stoves, etc.
9.561 13.22
c_hhurate cluster average of household unemployment rate, excluding index households
contribution to the average 0.219 0.16
d_hhurate district average of household unemployment rate, excluding index households
contribution to the average 0.219 0.14
c_hhedyrs cluster average of household mean years of education, excluding index households
contribution to the average 7.302 2.19
d_hhedyrs cluster average of household mean years of education, excluding index households
contribution to the average 7.303 1.91
lnc_hhpci log of cluster average of household per capita income, excluding index households
contribution to the average 5.963 1.01
lnd_hhpci log of district average of household per capita income, excluding index households
contribution to the average 6.059 0.97
lrdm_inc natural log of the race-specific district mean income (mean of household per capita
income of all households of own race within the households dis trict of residence) 5.945 0.99
r_pciq1 household is in the first quintile of its own races national distribution of income =1;
0 otherwise (omitted category) 0.200 0.40
r_pciq2 household is in the second quintile of its own races national distributi on of income =1;
0 otherwise 0.200 0.40
r_pciq3 household is in the third quintile of its own races national distribution of income =1;
0 otherwise 0.200 0.40
r_pciq4 household is in the fourth quintile of its own races national distribution of income=1; 0
otherwise 0.200 0.40
r_pciq5 household is in the fifth quintile of its own races national distribution of income=1; 0
otherwise 0.199 0.40
d_pciq1 household is in the first quintile of its districts distribution of income=1; 0 otherwise
(omitted category) 0.182 0.39
d_pciq2 household is in the second quintile of its districts distribution of income=1; 0 otherwise 0.209 0.41
d_pciq3 household is in the third quintile of its districts distribution of income=1; 0 otherwise 0.205 0.40
d_pciq4 household is in the fourth quintile of its districts distribution of income=1; 0 otherwise 0.208 0.41
d_pciq5 household is in the fifth quintile of its districts distribution of income=1; 0 otherwise 0.195 0.40
tv Household owns a television set=1; 0 otherwise 0.453 0.50
parents_ Whether respondents think they are richer=1; the same=2 or poorer=3 than their own
parents 2.282 0.83
The first column of Table 2 presents a general specification of the ordered probit equation of
subjective well-being. Column (2) provides our preferred, parsimonious specification,
together with the marginal effects of the variables on the probability of being ‘satisfied’ or ‘very
satisfied’ with life.
Table 2: Ordered Probit Model of Perceived Life Satisfaction
Notes: the column ‘Marginal effect’ shows the marginal effect of a variable on the probability of being ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’. In this, and
other, tables, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
Community, Comparisons and Subjective Well-being in a Divided Society
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Column a Column b (parsimonious specification)
Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Marginal effect
Control variables
age16-25 0.322 3.7 *** 0.339 3.9 *** 0.121
age26-35 0.060 1.1 0.067 1.1 0.023
age46-55 0.031 0.4 0.036 0.5 0.012
age56-65 0.117 1.2 0.128 1.2 0.046
age>=66 0.253 2.3 ** 0.266 2.4 *** 0.094
hhsizem -0.014 -1.2 -0.018 -1.6 -0.007
hhnchild 0.051 2.9 *** 0.052 3.1 *** 0.019
male 0.000 0.0
migrate 0.213 2.1 ** 0.213 1.9 * 0.076
primary -0.031 -0.4
junior -0.036 -0.6
secondary 0.018 0.3
higher 0.199 2.2 ** 0.218 2.8 *** 0.078
hhdaysic -0.005 -2.3 ** -0.005 -2.2 ** -0.001
ironroof -0.123 -2.0 ** -0.120 -1.9 * -0.042
pipeint -0.047 -0.4
wdist 0.000 0.8
personpr -0.023 -1.1
connecte 0.041 0.6
nolfpb -0.010 -0.2 0.001 0.0 0.000
impass -0.072 -1.2 -0.057 -0.9 -0.020
pubtran 0.103 1.7 * 0.107 1.7 * 0.038
racialm 0.246 2.7 *** 0.249 2.6 *** 0.092
metropol -0.244 -1.9 * -0.291 -2.8 *** -0.100
urban1 -0.212 -2.2 ** -0.251 -3.0 *** -0.086
homeland 0.103 1.0
n_victim -0.091 -2.3 ** -0.089 -2.3 ** -0.031
ownship_ 0.079 1.8 * 0.097 2.2 ** 0.034
debt -0.065 -1.6 * -0.062 -1.5 -0.022
c_urateb -0.581 -3.2 *** -0.529 -2.7 *** -0.188
Hypothesis variables
african -0.597 -5.3 *** -0.576 -5.0 *** -0.215
Coloured -0.225 -2.0 ** -0.228 -1.9 -0.077
indian -0.193 -1.8 * -0.209 -2.0 ** -0.071
hhurate -0.152 -3.2 *** -0.145 -3.0 *** -0.052
ln_hhcpi 0.105 5.2 *** 0.110 5.0 *** 0.039
assetval 0.014 5.4 *** 0.014 5.9 *** 0.005
Province yes yes
LogL -11111.19 -11117.50
Restr. LogL -12199.69 -12199.69
Pseudo-R
2
N
0.0892
8279
0.0887
8279
Province dummies are included but not reported. In this table, and subsequent tables, the
explanatory variables are divided up into ‘control variables’ and ‘hypothesis variables’, i.e. the
variables required to test our six hypotheses. In several respects, the equation is similar to
that found in other studies (Helliwell, 2002; Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Di Tella,
MacCulloch, and Oswald, 2001; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998): subjective well-being
falls with age and then rises; is increasing in health, education and income; and falls with
unemployment.
Consider the size of these effects. An increase in absolute household income (log of
household per capita income, ln_hhpci) from one standard deviation below to one standard
deviation above the mean raises the probability of being satisfied or very satisfied with life by
11 percentage points. Considering that overall probability of being satisfied or very satisfied is
33 per cent, this is not a dramatic increase for the large implied increase in income. The
African probability of being satisfied or very satisfied is 21.5 percentage points lower than that
of Whites, even after controlling for observed income, education, employment, etc. Those
who live in metropolitan cities (metropol) are 10 percentage points less likely to be in the
highest two subjective well-being categories than are rural-dwellers (omitted category). The
household’s own unemployment rate (hhurate) has a smaller effect on the probability of being
in the top two happiness categories than does the cluster unemployment rate (c_urateb).
Going from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the household
unemployment rate reduces that probability by 4.1 percentage points, but doing the same for
the cluster unemployment rate reduces it by 9.8 percentage points. The effects of higher
education (higher), health (hhdaysic), crime (n_victim), household assets (assetval), and
debt (debt) are all as expected and significant but small.
5.1 Space-based Comparator Groups
Table 3 explores the role of space-based relative concepts in determining happiness. This is
done by including, in the happiness equation, the average income, unemployment rate and
years of education of households in the cluster, and in the district, calculated by averaging
household characteristics within the cluster, and the district, but net of each household’s
contribution to the average. The full set of control variables, corresponding to the
parsimonious specification of Table 2 is included in all cases3 but only relevant control
variables and the hypothesis variables are presented in the table.
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3 The only exception is the cluster unemployment rate, c_urateb), which is dropped because it is very collinear with
the cluster mean of the household unemployment rate of all households within the cluster (chhurate) that we
include in columns (a), (b) and (g) of Table 3
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Table 3: The Effects of Space-based Comparator Groups on Subjective Well-being
Notes: The variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All the control variables included in the parsimonious specification of Table 2 are
included in each estimate. The addition of the hypothesis variables makes little difference to their coefficients. Therefore only the hypothesis
variables are reported. The number of observations in each case is 8,279, and the restricted log L = -12,199.69.
The household’s absolute income (ln_hhpci) raises, and the household unemployment rate
(hhurateb) depresses, happiness very significantly. The first relative concept we consider is
relative unemployment, defined as the unemployment rate of others in the cluster and then in
the district. The cluster mean household unemployment rate (c_hhurate) reduces happiness
significantly. Column (b) adds the district average of household unemployment rate
(d_hhurate). This has no relationship with household happiness but the cluster unemployment
variable continues to reduce household happiness significantly. The second relative concept
considered is others’ education. Columns (c) and (d) respectively add cluster and district
averages of years of education. Cluster education (c_hhedyrs) enters positively and
significantly and district education (d_hhedyrs) negatively but insignificantly. The final relative
concept considered is others’ income. Column (e) adds the log of average household per
11
Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t
African -0.6 *** -0.6 *** -0.58 *** -0.58 *** -0.47 *** -0.47 *** -0.45 ***
(-5.2) (-5.2) (-5.2) (-5.2) (-4.2) (-4.1) (-3.8)
Coloured -0.23 * -0.23 * -0.2 * -0.2 * -0.09 -0.08 -0.07
(-1.9) (-1.9) (-1.7) (-1.7) (-0.8) (-0.7) (-0.6)
Indian -0.21 ** -0.2 ** -0.2 * -0.2 * -0.14 -0.13 -0.14
(-2.0) (-2.0) (-1.9) (-1.9) (-1.4) (-1.3) (-1.4)
hhurate -0.19 *** -0.19 *** -0.22 *** -0.22 *** -0.2 *** -0.2 *** -0.2 ***
(-4.0) (-4.0) (-4.4) (-4.4) (-3.9) (-3.9) (-4.1)
ln_hhpci 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 ***
-5.1 -5 -4.7 -4.7 -4.2 -4.2 -4.1
assetval 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
-6.1 -6.1 -6 -6 -5.7 -5.6 -5.6
c_hhurate -0.5 ** -0.6 ** 0.09
(-2.0) (-2.1) -0.3
d_hhurate 0.17 -0.25
-0.4 (-0.5)
c_hhedyrs 0.05 *** 0.06 *** 0.01
-3 -2.4 -0.2
d_hhedyrs -0.01 0.02
(-0.3) -0.6
ln_chhpci 0.22 *** 0.27 *** 0.27 ***
-5.1 -4.7 -3.3
ln_dhhpci -0.07 -0.12
(-1.2) (-1.4)
Log L
0.0885 0.0907 0.0909 0.091Pseudo- 0.088 0.088 0.0885
-11125.93 -11125.52 -11117.44 -11117.33 -11093.273 -11091.02 -11086.54
(e) (f) (g)
Hypothesis variables
(a) (b) (c) (d)
R
2
capita income of the community (lnc_hhpci). This enters positively and significantly. Column
(f) adds district average income (lnd_hhpci), and this enters negatively but insignificantly.
An interesting and consistent pattern thus emerges: within the cluster, households are
altruistic or receive mutual support but within a wider area, the district, they compete with
others. When all three dimensions – unemployment, education and income – are added
together in column (g), the spatial education and unemployment rates no longer matter,
conditional on income. Only the income dimension is significant: the income of others within
the cluster increases happiness, but income within the district weakly decreases happiness.
These are fascinating results: Within the local cluster, other people’s income produces
positive externalities on the household’s utility. Only when the comparator group is widened
to include more distant others – those in the district as a whole – does other people’s income
create negative spill-overs.
The results have four possible explanations. One is that households within a cluster share
risks with each other, i.e. provide mutual insurance and support. The expectation of
reciprocity causes people who live in a risky environment to value the income of their
reference group. This is plausible when there is high unemployment and widespread lack of
unemployment insurance, as in South Africa. To test this explanation we estimated the
well-being equations separately for Africans and for Whites, since Africans have a higher
unemployment rate (39 per cent compared with 5 per cent) and much poorer access to formal
insurance mechanisms. The estimates show that the positive effect of mean cluster income
on household well-being is the same for both races. The coefficient for Africans is 0.271 (t =
4.28) and for Whites 0.272 (t = 4.56). This result is inconsistent with the insurance
explanation.
A second interpretation is that cluster income serves as a proxy for the ‘social wage’, i.e. in
better-off clusters, the level of public and other amenities such as education, health,
sanitation, etc. is higher. We conducted the following test of this hypothesis. We first removed
all cluster-level variables and introduced cluster dummy variables instead. The estimated
cluster coefficients were then regressed on community amenities: the results are shown in
Table 4. The explanatory variables are divided into cluster-level, district-level, broader
spatial, and community amenity determinants. Whereas the coefficient on cluster average
income is significantly positive, the other cluster and district variables are jointly insignificant.
Similarly, the ten community amenity variables that are excluded in the second column are
jointly insignificant in the first column.4 We could find no support for the social wage
explanation.5
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4 F(10,299) = 0.90; p-value of F test = 0.534
5 Ideally, panel data are required to provide a more powerful control to take out all cluster fixed effects but we have
only a cross-section.
Table 4: OLS Regression of Cluster Coefficients on Cluster and District Variables
Note: The dependent variable is the coefficient on cluster dummies in the ordered probit equation of subjective well-being, using parsimonious
specification of Table 2. The cluster variables c_wdist, c_ironroof and c_electri are jointly insignificant. Similarly, all the ten variables excluded
in the second column are jointly insignificant in the first [F(10,299)=0.90; p-value of F test=0.534]. The prefix c_ stands for cluster. Thus,
c_wdist is the cluster average of distance to water, c_ironroof is cluster average of the 0/1 variable whether the family home has an iron roof,
c_electri is cluster average of the 0/1 variable whether the household has electricity, and so on.
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Coefficient t- value Coefficient t -value
Location/spatial variables
wcape 0.535 3.8 *** 0.640 4.9 ***
ncape 1.047 4.1 *** 1.076 4.4 ***
ecape 0.330 2.1 ** 0.403 2.8 ***
natal 0.493 3.4 *** 0.595 4.4 ***
ofs 0.383 2.2 ** 0.303 1.8 *
etvl 0.551 3.1 *** 0.524 3.1 ***
ntvl 0.425 2.5 *** 0.459 2.8 ***
nw 0.118 0.7 0.090 0.6
homeland 0.065 0.5 0.111 1.0
metropol -0.349 -2.2 ** -0.268 -2.0 **
urban1 -0.251 -2.2 ** -0.171 -1.8 *
Community amenities
pub_tran -0.021 -0.2 -0.002 0.0
distrans -0.004 -1.2
numfaci 0.001 0.3 0.001 0.2
disfaci 0.000 1.5
impass -0.085 -1.0 -0.080 -1.0
tarroad 0.021 0.2
Community means of household variables
c_wdist 0.000 0.9
c_ironroof -0.135 -1.1
c_electri 0.015 0.1
c_personp -0.126 -1.6 -0.158 -2.2 **
c_hhedyrs 0.006 0.1
c_hhurate 0.218 0.6
lnc_hhpci 0.311 2.7 *** 0.293 3.9 ***
District means of household variables
d_hhedyrs 0.060 1.2
d_hhurate -0.472 -1.0
lnd_hhpci -0.162 -1.3 -0.013 -0.2
_cons -0.399 -0.7 -0.876 -1.7 *
N 327 332
Adjusted 2R
Mean of dependent variable 0.8235 0.8235
0.2614 0.2654
There is a third, econometric, explanation: either that cluster income and household income
are positively collinear and cluster income is picking up some of the effect that is attributable
to household income, or that household income is measured with error and cluster income is
serving as a proxy for household income. We explored these possibilities by regressing
household income (ln_hhpci) on a full set of household-level explanatory variables, first
without and then with the inclusion of cluster income – which had a coefficient of 0.564 (t =
48.5) – the adjusted R-squared rose from 0.558 to 0.656. This rather small increase when
cluster income was added suggests that conditional collinearity is not a serious problem. The
high value of R-squared without cluster income suggests that household income is not
subject to serious measurement error. Even if it were, the fact that the same set of
explanatory variables can explain 55.8 per cent of the variation in household mean income
but only 40.1 per cent of the variation in cluster mean income suggests that cluster income
cannot serve as a good proxy for household income.
The fourth possible explanation is that people are altruistic towards others in their own
clusters, i.e. clusters are treated like extended families, but people feel relatively deprived
when the spatial orbit is widened to the district. It is pertinent to note that the cluster is a
geographically small unit within which households are likely to know each other.6 Pursuing
this idea, whereas the average cluster contained 580 households, we divided households
into two groups, those living in smaller clusters (containing no more than 200 households)
and those in larger clusters (with more than 200 households). Compared to the coefficient on
the cluster mean income variable for the sample as a whole (0.199, robust t = 4.0)7, the
coefficient increases to 0.308 (robust t = 4.6) for households in small clusters and falls to
0.058 (robust t = 0.69) for those in large clusters. Thus, the relationship is powerful in small
clusters and weak or absent in large clusters. These results provide support for the
explanation in terms of altruism or fellow-feeling in a close community.
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6 The documentation for the SALDRU survey (SALDRU, 1994) states: “The sampling frame was drawn up on the
basis of small, clearly demarcated area units [clusters], each with a population estimate… For most of the country
census ESDs [Enumeration Sub-Districts] were used. Where some ESDs comprised relatively large populations
as for instance in some black townships such as Soweto, aerial photographs were used to divide the area into
blocks of approximately equal population size. In other instances, particularly in some of the former homelands,
the area units were not ESDs but villages or village groups.”
7 Column (c) of Table 3
5.2. Race-based Comparator Groups
We turn to the role of racial concepts in determining happiness, i.e. the hypothesis that the
relevant comparator group for the household is other households of the same race (Table 5).
Systematic racial segregation in apartheid South African society made it plausible that
people’s aspirations were linked to what they believed to be the highest states attainable for
persons of their own race. We tested for race-relative effects in two ways: firstly, income
relative to that of others of the same race within the district and, secondly, the same concept
applied at the national level.
Table 5: The Effects of Race-based Comparator Groups on Subjective Well-being
Notes: as for Table 3. Column (a) repeats column (f) of Table 3.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t
African -0.467 -4.1 *** -0.617 -4.0 *** -0.710 -5.8 *** -0.891 -5.6 *** -0.469 -4.1 ***
Coloured -0.082 -0.7 -0.203 -1.5 -0.250 -2.0 ** -0.292 -2.7 *** -0.083 -0.7
Indian -0.132 -1.3 -0.198 -1.7 * -0.236 -2.2 ** -0.315 -2.6 *** -0.133 -1.3
hhurate -0.200 -3.9 *** -0.189 -3.7 *** -0.188 -3.7 *** -0.176 -3.5 *** -0.201 -3.9 ***
ln_hhpci 0.091 4.2 *** 0.104 5.3 *** 0.010 0.3 0.019 0.6 0.093 2.1 **
assetval 0.014 5.6 *** 0.014 5.7 *** 0.013 5.2 *** 0.013 5.3 *** 0.013 5.7 ***
lnc_hhpci 0.265 4.7 *** 0.296 5.2 *** 0.260 4.6 *** 0.292 5.2 *** 0.266 4.7 ***
lnd_hhpci -0.070 -1.2 0.003 0.0 -0.069 -1.2 0.009 0.1 -0.071 -1.1
lrdm_inc -0.170 -1.9 * -0.183 -2.1 **
r_pciq2 0.105 2.2 ** 0.102 2.2 **
r_pciq3 0.105 1.8 * 0.106 1.8 *
r_pciq4 0.276 3.6 *** 0.284 3.7 ***
r_pciq5 0.319 2.8 *** 0.342 3.0 ***
d_pciq2 -0.049 -1.0
d_pciq3 -0.006 -0.1
d_pciq4 -0.062 -0.7
d_pciq5 -0.001 0.0
Log L -11091.02 -11083.29 -11080.53 -11071.66 -11088.52
Pseudo- 2R 0.0909 0.0915 0.0917 0.0925 0.0911
The high correlation between household income and the relative position of the household in
the national income distribution rules out the inclusion of both together in a subjective
well-being function. However, this is not the case for race-based income distributions. For
instance, a household with the average per capita income of the sample as a whole (Rand
671) would be in the fifth quintile of its race-specific income distribution if it were African, the
fourth quintile if it were Coloured, the third quintile if it were Indian, and the first quintile if it
were White.
Column (a) of Table 5 repeats the best specification from Table 3, i.e. includes space-based
relative income measures. Column (b) includes the natural log of race-specific district mean
income (lrdm_inc). This enters negatively and has a large coefficient, although it is only
weakly significant. It suggests that relative deprivation does play a part in the determination of
happiness. Controlling for household income, the higher the income of others of the same
race in the district, the lower is subjective well-being. It is notable that the coefficient on the
race-specific mean income in the district, in column (b), has a bigger negative value than that
on (overall) mean income in the district, in column (a). In column (b), where both of these
variables are included, only the race-specific variable is significant.8 The marginal effect (not
reported) of lrdm_inc on the probability of being satisfied or very satisfied is -0.2145. Thus, if
race-specific district mean income increases by one standard deviation (0.9889) from its
mean (5.946), the probability of being satisfied or very satisfied with life falls by a large 21.2
percentage points.
Column (c) includes the household’s quintile position in the race-specific national distribution
of income (r_pciq2 to r_pciq5), households in the poorest race-specific income quintile
(r_pciq1) being the base category. Column (d) adds log of race-specific district mean income,
again with a significant negative coefficient, but the coefficients on the quintiles are hardly
altered. In both cases, there is a near monotonic increase in happiness as the household’s
relative quintile position in the national race-specific income distribution increases. Moreover,
the household’s absolute income (ln_hhpci) falls to complete insignificance for the first time.9
The implication is that, for instance, a White household and an African household with the
same income can differ in their subjective well-being because they belong to different
race-specific income quintiles.
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8 If district mean income (lddhhpci) is dropped from the equation, the coefficient on lrdm_inc barely changes to
-0.1684 (t=2.12).
9 Recall that an African household with the average household per capita income (R 671 per month) would be in the
top quintile of its own race’s national income distribution but a white household with the same per capita income
(R 671 pm) would be in the bottom quintile of its race’s national distribution of income. Thus, the relationship
between household per capita income (ln_hhpci) and race-specific income quintiles (r_pciq1 to r_pciq5) should
not be too high. The correlation coefficient between ln_hhpci and r_pciq5 is 0.5337, which is not so high as to
induce hopelessly high multicollinearity. A regression of ln_hhpci on the r_pciq2, r_pciq3, r_pciq4 and r_pciq5
dummy variables yields an adjusted R-square of 0.547. Even if the correlation is judged to be high, we would
expect the continuous variable (ln_hhpci) rather than the dummy variables r_pciq2 to r_pciq5 to ‘pick up’ the effect
of income simply because there is far more variation in the former than in the latter. The fact that it doesn’t,
suggests that multicollinearity is not a big problem. However, we do not wish to conclude that only race-relative
income position matters to subjective well-being and not absolute income. This is because in all of our other
specifications, absolute income (ln_hhpci) does matter very significantly
It cannot be argued that the household’s income quintile position simply proxies its absolute
income because the same income places households of different races in very different
race-specific income quintiles. For instance, a regression of ln_hhpci on the r_pciq2, r_pciq3,
r_pciq4, and r_pciq5 dummy variables yields an adjusted R-squared of only 0.547; and in
Table 3, columns (c) and (d), the continuous household income variable fails to do any work
despite its greater variation than the dummy variables.
We conduct a counterfactual simulation on the basis of the results in column (c). Consider an
African and a White household possessing identical characteristics and income – both with
the average characteristics and income of the sample as a whole. First, introduce the fact that
the African household is in the highest race-specific income quintile and the White household
is in the lowest. This creates a difference in the probability of being satisfied or very satisfied
with life in favour of African household of 12.5 percentage points. Second, take into account
the fact that the African dummy variable (the White dummy being the default category) has a
large negative coefficient. This reduces the probability of the African household being
satisfied or very satisfied by 23.4 percentage points. Thus, the disadvantage of being African
greatly outweighs the advantage of being a relatively rich African.
Locational relativities are examined further in column (e) which includes the household’s
quintile position in the district distribution of income (d_pciq2 to d_pciq5, the base category
being households in the lowest district income quintile, d_pciq1). These dummy variables
have small coefficients and are not at all significant. This contrasts with the results in columns
(c) and (d) and suggests that in South Africa in 1993, the relevant others are not others in the
district but others of the same race.
5.3. Other Comparator Groups
In Table 6 we explore the importance of two other comparator groups: (1) oneself in the past,
and (2) those seen on television. The SALDRU survey asked the respondent “when you
compare your situation with that of your parents, do you think you are richer, about the same,
or poorer than they were?”. The answer yields the variable parents_ , which is coded as
follows: richer than parents = 1; the same = 2; poorer than parents = 3. The sample
households were distributed across these categories as follows: 24 per cent were richer,
23 per cent were the same, and 52 per cent were poorer than their parents.10 We assume that
households in which respondents claim to be poorer than their parents consist of adults who
are poorer now than they themselves were when young, i.e. poorer than their own past.
Poverty relative to parents substantially and significantly reduces subjective well-being.: the
coefficient on parents_ is –0.256.
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10 The fact that 52 per cent of respondents felt poorer than their parents was surprising to the authors but reasonable
to the director of the SALDRU survey (personal correspondence).
Table 6: The Effects of Proxied Past Income and of Television on Subjective Well-being
Notes: All the control variables included in the parsimonious specification of Table 2 are included in each estimate, but only the relevant
hypothesis variables and relevant control variables are reported. Recall from Table 1 that TV = 1 if the household owns a television set, and TV
= 0 otherwise. The variable parents_ has the values 0, 1, or 2 according to whether respondent households report that they are richer, the
same, or poorer than their parents’ households, respectively.
It is also possible that the others seen on television provide people with the standards they
then aspire to. If this is the case, and if the existence of an opulent reference group can be
proxied by the presence of a television set in the household, we would expect to find a
negative sign on the dummy variable indicating that the household possesses a television set
(TV). Table 6 reveals no relationship between TV and happiness, ceteris paribus. This
suggests that television images do not create ambitious aspirations. However, other
interpretations are possible. Because television programmes may have been
culture-specific, we estimated the subjective well-being equations separately for Africans and
Whites. In the equation for blacks, the TV variable had a positive but insignificant coefficient,
hinting that ownership of a television set was proxying wealth. For Whites there was a
negative coefficient on the TV dummy variable, though the effect of the variable was not well
determined: only 6 per cent of sample White households did not own a set.
5.4. Interaction between Absolute and Relative Income
We ask whether the importance of relative income varies with absolute income. We do so by
examining whether relative income affects subjective well-being differently among poor and
non-poor households. Households whose per capita income falls below the ‘household
supplementary level’ poverty-line of R251 per month in 1993 – a measure of what is required
for basic subsistence – are defined as ‘poor’ households and the rest as ‘non-poor’. We use
the split-sample approach, which is equivalent to the conventional approach of interacting the
poverty dummy variable with the regressors. Table 7 presents ordered probit models of
subjective well-being.
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With Dummy variable TV With variable parents_
Coeff. Robust t Coeff. Robust t
ln_hhpci 0.109 4.8 *** 0.079 3.5 ***
assetval 0.013 5.5 *** 0.012 5.2 ***
TV 0.040 0.8
Parents_ -0.256 -11.6 ***
N 8279 8244
LogL -11116.82 -10926.59
Restricted LogL -12199.69 -12148.93
Pseudo- 2R 0.0888 0.1006
Table 7 compares the determinants of happiness for the poor and non-poor. A number of
control variables are presented because they show some interesting contrasts.11 Poverty is
more detrimental to the perceived well-being of the elderly than of the young: elderly persons
(aged 66 or over) are significantly happier than 36-45 year-olds only if they are above the
poverty line, whereas poverty status does not matter much to the young (aged 16-25), who
are happier than the 36-45 year-olds irrespective of whether their households are below or
above the poverty line. Vicissitudes such as sickness (hhdaysic), crime (n_victim), and
indebtedness (debt) matter more to the poor than they do to the non-poor. However,
unemployment (hhurate) matters significantly more to the non-poor than to the poor. This
apparently counter-intuitive result may be due to the fact that the poor mostly live in high
unemployment areas where one’s own unemployment appears less blameworthy or more
acceptable because a high proportion of acquaintances are also unemployed. This
explanation was tested by fitting happiness equations separately for low and high
unemployment areas. It showed that unemployment depressed perceived well-being
significantly only in lower than mean unemployment rate areas (the coefficient and robust
t-value of hhurate1 in high and low unemployment areas were -0.097 (t = -1.5) and -0.399 (t =
-4.0) respectively.12
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11 The apparent difference in the effect of race is spurious since there are virtually no whites (only 0.6 per cent of the
poor) below the poverty line, i.e. in the base race category in the first column.
12 Other studies also find that the unemployed suffer less in high unemployment areas (Clark, 2003;Kingdon and
Knight, 2003; Powdthavee, 2003).
Table 7: Subjective well-being, by poverty status
Note: The poverty line used is the Household Supplementary Level, which was R 251 per month in 1993. The estimated equations are the
parsimonious specification of Table 2 plus the measures of relative income. Only these measures plus the noteworthy control variables are
reported.
Our hypothesis is that absolute and relative income have different effects in the two
sub-samples. This is tested using two specifications, one using race-specific district mean
income as the relative income variable and the other using race-specific income quintile
position. In the former case, log of household per capita income (lnhhpci) is significantly
positive for both poor and non-poor but, whereas the coefficient on log of race-specific mean
district income (lrdm_inc) is not significant for the poor, it is negative, significant and large for
the non-poor. In the latter case, lnhhpci is positive and significant for the poor and negative
but not significantly so for the non-poor; and the coefficients on the race-specific income
quintiles rise monotonically with the quintile, and are significant at the upper quintiles, but
there is no pattern for the poor. For households in income-poverty, absolute income matters
in both specifications, but for those above the income-poverty line, it matters in only one of
them. The variables representing relative deprivation do not reduce the well-being of the poor
in either specification, but they do so for the non-poor in both specifications.
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Below poverty line Above poverty line
Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t
Control variables
age1625 0.267 2.2 ** 0.272 2.3 ** 0.357 3.3 *** 0.348 3.3 ***
age2635 0.140 1.1 0.141 1.1 0.039 0.6 0.022 0.4
age4655 -0.070 -0.4 -0.070 -0.4 0.057 0.7 0.060 0.7
age5665 0.172 1.0 0.178 1.0 0.106 0.8 0.088 0.7
age_66 0.125 0.6 0.128 0.6 0.357 2.5 *** 0.362 2.5 ***
hhdaysic -0.008 -2.9 *** -0.008 -2.9 *** -0.001 -0.2 -0.001 -0.4
hhurate1 -0.121 -2.2 ** -0.117 -2.1 ** -0.309 -3.1 *** -0.345 -3.5 ***
nolfpb 0.030 0.5 0.031 0.5 -0.045 -0.4 -0.052 -0.5
assetval 0.018 4.6 *** 0.018 4.5 *** 0.012 4.4 *** 0.011 4.1 ***
african -0.012 0.0 -0.089 -0.3 -0.802 -4.8 *** -0.920 -5.7 ***
colored 0.011 0.0 -0.042 -0.1 -0.280 -1.8 * -0.328 -2.1 **
indian -0.038 -0.1 -0.048 -0.1 -0.229 -1.8 * -0.262 -2.1 **
n_victim -0.188 -3.1 *** -0.188 -3.1 *** -0.042 -0.9 -0.039 -0.8
ownship_ 0.126 2.0 ** 0.127 2.0 ** 0.072 1.5 0.048 1.0
debt -0.081 -2.0 ** -0.080 -2.0 ** -0.068 -1.3 -0.054 -1.0
Hypothesis variables
lnhhpci 0.091 3.6 *** 0.071 2.2 *** 0.132 3.3 *** -0.087 -1.0
lddhhpci 0.014 0.2 0.029 0.4 0.092 1.2 -0.030 -0.4
lrdm_inc 0.026 0.3 -0.385 -3.7 ***
r_pciq2 0.072 1.3 0.071 0.8
r_pciq3 0.038 0.6 0.149 1.3
r_pciq4 0.103 1.0 0.449 3.3 ***
r_pciq5 -- -- 0.536 2.7 ***
N 4142 4142 4137 4137
Log L -5302.997 -5301.9212 -5636.746 -5641.9665
Restr. LogL -5540.3536 -5540.3536 -6238.7515 -6238.7515
Psuedo-
2
R 0.0428 0.0430 0.0965 0.0957
We conducted various checks on the robustness of this set of results. Experimentation with
another poverty line (the ‘supplementary living level’, equal to R220 per month in 1993)
makes no difference to any of the patterns.13 We also divided the sample into terciles and
compared the lowest and the highest tercile. Again, in both specifications, absolute income
mattered to the poorest third and relative income to the richest.14
5. Conclusion
We can now attempt to answer the questions posed at the start. First, there is a good deal of
evidence that both the income of the household and the income of other households
influence subjective well-being. Some of our estimates suggest that the latter relative to the
former is more important than the former on its own. Second, the relative concepts that count
are unemployment, education and income. However, unemployment and education are to
some extent collinear with income. When all three are included, only income remains
important. Third, we were able to identify three types of reference group. Comparisons are
made with the income of other households, the relevant others being based on space, on
race, and on previous income.
Fourth, we found that higher income of other households in a small community raises
subjective well-being. This is a powerful and, to our knowledge, a new result. We considered
four explanations: altruism, mutual insurance, a social wage, and non-causal association.
The results of our various tests were consistent with altruism and fellow-feeling, but
inconsistent with the alternative explanations. By contrast, higher income of households of
the same race lowers subjective well-being. This is consistent with perceptions of relative
deprivation – aspirations ahead of achievements – possibly arising from standard setting,
notions of unfairness, or envy. It appears that, whereas close spatial proximity (the same
cluster) creates a community, close social proximity (the same race) creates comparisons or
sets goals and aspirations.
Fifth, our evidence suggests that positive spill-overs on subjective well-being at the local
(cluster) level are diluted as orbits of comparison are expanded to include strangers. At the
broader (district) level we found that spill-overs are negative. Similarly, perceptions of relative
deprivation in relation to persons of the same race are evident not at the local level but at
higher levels of geographical aggregation.
Sixth, the influence of relative income varies with absolute income: its effect on happiness is
strengthened as income rises. Absolute income is an important determinant of the happiness
of people who are below the poverty-line, whereas their relative income is not. For those who
are not poor, within-race relative income is important – generating relative deprivation. The
effect of absolute income is ambiguous for this group, depending on the specification of
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13 The poverty lines are obtained from May (1998)
14 We also tried adding product terms in the equation that uses the race-specific district mean income lrdm_inc
(interacting this variable with household mean income per capita and its square) – the hypothesis being that the
relative income effect becomes stronger at higher levels of absolute income – but the coefficients on the
interaction terms were not significant.
relative income. In one specification, conditioning on household race-specific income
quintile, the absolute income of the household appears to be irrelevant.
The finding that South Africans confined themselves to comparisons with others of their own
race corresponds to the claim that English slum-dwellers a century ago confined themselves
to comparisons within the slum (Roberts,1971). It suggests that peoples’ reference groups
are endogenously chosen. South Africa in 1993 inherited a legacy of White privilege and
black disadvantage. Africans would want to reduce hurt by avoiding comparisons with others
whose achieved states were infeasible for them. Similarly, Whites would want to assess
themselves in relation to other Whites, the community of which they felt part; comparisons
with blacks would involve loss of face.
Policy-making requires an understanding of reality, including the reality of people’s
perceptions. Nevertheless, we are hesitant to draw policy conclusions from our results. One
reason is the argument of Sen (1983, 1999, and elsewhere) eschewing the ‘metric of utilities’
in favour of the ‘capabilities’ approach to addressing poverty; similarly, others regard the
fulfilment of ‘basic needs’ as the appropriate conclusion. The underlying case against the
utilities approach is that, by adjusting their aspirations to reality, people are conditioned to
bear hardship. In the words of Sen (1999, p.358):
Utilities can sometimes be very malleable in response to deprivation.
The fact that people adjust themselves as well as possible to their condition does not diminish
the case for redressing their condition. Nevertheless, Kingdon and Knight (2003) examine
these issues and attempt to justify subjective well-being as a criterion for policy-making.
Ultimately, a value judgement is needed.
A second reason can be illustrated by the following case. Consider two households of equal
income but of different race. One, being a poor member of a rich race, feels relatively
deprived, whereas the other, being a rich member of a poor race, does not. Should policy
favour the former? In the South African case we would disagree. We know from the estimates
that a White household has a lower probability of being satisfied or very satisfied with life than
an African household with equal income, on account of their different race-specific relative
positions. However, the difference is more than offset by the negative coefficient on the
dummy variable representing African race. This coefficient is likely to reflect the legacy of
disadvantages, not all observable in the dataset, that black people suffered under apartheid.
It may also represent African relative deprivation in response to the huge between-race
income inequalities, which we were unable to capture in our estimates. The negative effect on
subjective well-being of being African is best addressed by pro-African policies.
The apartheid policy of divide and rule had accentuated racial differences. Our findings
suggest that people did not feel themselves to be part of a common society. Such perceptions
may have delayed political change in South Africa. Over the last decade, however, a culture
of equal rights in a single society has blossomed, a black middle class has burgeoned, and
some residential mixing has occurred. If this has widened orbits of comparison, it may have
increased feelings of relative deprivation among Africans. It would be interesting to examine
the determinants of subjective well-being in South Africa today, to discover whether and how
reference groups have changed.
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Appendix Table 1: The Determinants of the Household’s Subjective Well-being
Including the Individual Respondent’s Personal Characteristics
Note: Recall from Table 1 that r_age and r_agesq are respondent's age and its square; r_edyrs and r_edyrsq are respondent's years of
education and its square; r_male is gender and r_empld whether the respondent is employed or not. Province dummy variables are included
but not reported.
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Parsimonious
equation from Table 2
(a)
Plus personal characteristics
of the household respondent
(b)
Coefficient Robust-t Coefficient Robust-t
Control variables
age16-25 0.339 3.9 *** 0.267 2.9 ***
age26-35 0.067 1.1 0.020 0.3
age46-55 0.036 0.5 0.084 1.1
age56-65 0.128 1.2 0.200 1.8 *
Age>=66 0.266 2.4 *** 0.331 2.7 ***
hhsizem -0.018 -1.6 -0.012 -1.0
hhnchild 0.052 3.1 *** 0.044 2.5 ***
migrate 0.213 1.9 * 0.218 2.0 **
higher 0.218 2.8 *** 0.250 2.8 ***
hhdaysic -0.005 -2.2 ** -0.005 -2.2 **
ironroof -0.120 -1.9 * -0.114 -1.8 *
hhurate -0.145 -3.0 *** -0.140 -2.7 ***
nolfpb 0.001 0.0 0.013 0.2
impass -0.057 -0.9 -0.062 -1.0
pubtran 0.107 1.7 * 0.111 1.8 *
ln_hhcpi 0.110 5.0 *** 0.115 5.1 ***
assetval 0.014 5.9 *** 0.015 6.2 ***
african -0.576 -5.0 *** -0.566 -5.0 ***
Coloured -0.228 -1.9 * -0.210 -1.8 *
indian -0.209 -2.0 ** -0.197 -1.9 *
racialm 0.249 2.6 *** 0.247 2.6 ***
metropol -0.291 -2.8 *** -0.300 -2.8 ***
urban1 -0.251 -3.0 *** -0.255 -3.2 ***
n_victim -0.089 -2.3 ** -0.092 -2.3 **
ownship_ 0.097 2.2 ** 0.099 2.3 **
debt -0.062 -1.5 -0.061 -1.5
c_urateb -0.529 -2.7 *** -0.542 -2.8 ***
Personal characteristics of respondent
r_age -0.010 -1.9 *
r_agesq 0.000 1.3
r_edyrs -0.006 -0.5
r_edyrsq 0.000 0.1
r_male -0.021 -0.6
r_empld 0.003 0.1
LogL -11117 .50 -10984.71
Restr LogL -12199.69 -12063.84
Psuedo-
2
R
N 8279
0.0887
8190
0.0895
